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THE DRUNK, THE INSANE, AND THE
CRIMINAL COURTS: DECIDING WHAT
TO MAKE OF SELF-INDUCED
INSANITY*
LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY**
If a madman commit a felony he shall not lose his life for it, because his
infirmity came by the Act of God; but if a drunken man commit a felony,
he shall not be excused, because his imperfection came by his own default.
-Lord Bacon, 16301
I. INTRODUCTION
There are genuine cases of involuntary intoxication, temporary in-
sanity, and automatism that are actuated by the combined influence of an
ingested substance and a preexisting condition of the body or the mind.2
Many of these cases have been categorized historically as a pathological
reaction to alcohol or, what is the same thing, pathological intoxication.
We now know that frequently these episodes are phenomena in which an
underlying brain abnormality is aggravated by alcohol consumption
causing temporary insanity and sometimes violence directed at others
nearby.3
Some courts fail to realize that what contributes significantly to the
distinctions between the legal categories of drunkenness and insanity (or
automatism), and voluntary and involuntary intoxication is the fault of
the actor-the actor's awareness of probable consequences-in bringing
* This article is based on work undertaken for the book, L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, THE
LEGAL DEFENSE OF PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION-WITH RELATED ISSUES OF TEMPORARY
AND SELF-INFLICTED INSANITY (1990).
** Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1. F. BACON, ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 29 (1630). The meaning of
the archaic term "default" is fault, not omission or neglect.
2. Automatism is differentiated from insanity by the concept of "mental disease" and the dif-
fering perceptions of the need to confine those acquitted. For purposes of this Article, the two
defenses of insanity and automatism are undifferentiated because the concept of fault as discussed
here would work to force them both, along with involuntary intoxication cases, into the category of
voluntary intoxication.
3. See generally L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOxICATION-WITH RE-
LATED ISSUES OF TEMPORARY AND SELF-INFLICTED INSANITY (1990).
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about the physical or mental condition. In what amounts to an extension
of the same oversight, those courts treat involuntary intoxication, tempo-
rary insanity, or automatism resulting from knowing consumption of al-
cohol as inculpatory fault on the part of the drinker, regardless of
whether any reason existed for that person to recognize the possibility of
an atypical reaction to the alcohol. Other courts-most of them, fortu-
nately-permit the jury to treat the actor's ensuing mental impairment as
a factual basis for a possible defense, unless they additionally find that
the actor was culpable in bringing about his or her own mental
incapacity.
II. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE CONCEPT OF FAULT IN THE
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF INSANITY AND
INTOXICATION
Were it not for the requirement of mental disease, intoxication, when
severe enough, is tantamount to insanity. "[I]nsanity and gross intoxica-
tion are alike in being conditions of irrationality at the time of the offend-
ing act; ... the two cases differ significantly as to ultimate culpability
because of the differences in the origin of that irrationality."4 What dis-
tinguishes the insanity defense from both voluntary and involuntary in-
toxication is the notion of "mental disease or defect," which must be the
reason for the actor's inability to reason, his "irrationality." Early litera-
ture provides minimal support for an explicit link between the develop-
ment of insanity law and intoxication law.' It is speculative, of course,
4. H. FiNGARETrE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 10
(1979) (emphasis in original).
5. The starting point from an historical point of view is the ancient position which did not
regard mental disorder, or insanity, as having any bearing upon the matter of criminal
guilt. Principles of criminal liability dating prior to the Norman Conquest persisted into
the thirteenth century and "a man who has killed another by misadventure, though he may
deserve a pardon, is guilty of a crime and the same rule applies ... to a lunatic .... "
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 950 (3d ed. 1982) (citing 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (5th ed. 1942)). Thus, as one might expect, insanity law did not antedate
development of the concept of mens rea. Still,
[b]y the time of Henry III (1216-1272) it was not uncommon for the king to grant a pardon
as a special act of grace for one who had committed homicide while of unsound mind
[citing F. POLLOCK & F. MArLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 480 (2d ed. 1899)] and
in the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) although there was no change in the theory of guilt as
a strict matter of law, such a homicide was regarded as pardonable to the extent that It
entitled the defendant to a special verdict saying he committed the crime while mad and
this practically insured the issuance of a pardon, which in time came to be granted as a
matter of course. [citing 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
151 (1883); 1 F. WHARTON & M. STILLE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE ch. 26 (5th ed.
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but it would seem that a definition of insanity which contained a no-fault
limitation (other than "mental disease"), would force recognition that
intoxication was an exception to insanity law and that involuntary intoxi-
cation was an exception to normal intoxication. The fault rationale ap-
pears at the very outset of intoxication law because it is so obvious, as the
initial quotation betokens.
Hawkins referred to insanity law in terms of a limitation expressed as a
"natural disability."6 This would seem to exclude self-induced insanity,
unless, of course, an underlying "natural disability" exacerbated by self-
administered alcohol would serve. While there is little explicit discussion
in the available writings of the early authorities, it is, nevertheless, clear
that what they envisioned was a condition of a more-or-less permanent
character such as "fixed" or "settled" insanity (brain damage) from alco-
hol abuse, not a merely temporary derangement. But they almost cer-
tainly recognized no other kind of condition, and if that is true, one
hardly would expect them to discuss the subject of temporary insanity
triggered by alcohol. It would be another century or two before it was
1905)]. During the reign of Edward 11 (1307-1327) insanity was beginning to be recog-
nized as a defense to crime, and life was spared although chattels were still forfeited, while
in the time of Edward III (1327-1377) absolute "madness" became a complete defense to a
criminal charge.
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra, at 950 (citing, inter alia, S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1925) (some references omitted)). There is language in documents surviv-
ing from 1278 that may refer to the release to sureties of a defendant when "the King learns by
inquisition taken by the justices to deliver Noting gaol [Nothingham jail] that Hugh hanged his
daughter whilst suffering from madness, and not by felony or of malice aforethought." Calendar of
Close Rolls, Edward I, 7 Edw. 1 518 (1278). More extensive and critical material may be found in S.
GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925) and F. WHARTON & M. STILLE,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1905). H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 53 (1954) (footnote omitted) provides:
Insanity did not become a defense to crime in England until the beginning of the fourteenth
century, and the authorities on the subject prior to the seventeenth century are so general
in their terms that they can be regarded as little more than "antiquarian curiosities." The
early institutional writers, Bracton, Littleton, and Fitzherbert, did not treat insanity as a
defense to crime at all, and their discussion of it as an excuse to civil liability is fragmen-
tary. Coke, writing in the seventeenth century, discussed the criminal liability of persons
non compos mentis, but only in a casual manner.
Id.
What we now commonly refer to in describing the history of the insanity defense as the "wild
beast" test was evidently developed in Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 765 (1724), in which
reference is made to a defendant who "doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than
a brute, or a wild beast .... See generally Platt & Diamond, The Origins and Development of the
"Wild Beast" Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J.
HIST. BEHAV. SCi. 355 (1965).
6. 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1824).
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known that alcohol could also trigger a temporary mental derangement
equivalent to a psychotic state, a link that could not earlier be made to
cases of temporary, self-induced insanity. Such cases could not arise
without knowledge of potentiation or other interactive effect.
In the leading reported case involving intoxication in early English
law, the court stressed the fault of the actor in becoming inebriated.
Singh reports on the case of Reniger v. Fogossa :1
Reniger v. Fogossa argued in the Exchequer Chamber in the time of Edward
VI in 1551, is the first reported case containing an early statement of the
law. There it was said:
'If a person that is drunk kills another this shall be felony, and he shall
be hanged for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was
drunk he had no understanding nor memory; but inasmuch as that
ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, he shall not be
privileged thereby.'"
Singh continues: "Lord Bacon, writing in the seventeenth century, said
substantially the same thing when he declared that if a drunken man
commit a felony he shall not be excused because his imperfection came
by his own default."9 Hale also summarized these opinions in his state-
ment that a drunken person "shall have no privilege by his voluntarily
contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his
right senses." 10 Thus, the very early conception was that a severely in-
toxicated person is mad but guilty nevertheless. Hale also added two
qualifications to his generally accepted statement of the rules regarding
intoxication as a defense:
1. That if a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the con-
trivance of his enemies, eat or drink such a thing as causeth such a tempo-
rary or permanent phrenzy, as aconitum or nux vomica, this puts him into
the same condition in reference to crimes as any other phrenzy and equally
excuseth him.
2. That although the simple phrenzy occasioned immediately by drunk-
enness excuse not in criminals, yet if by one or more such practices an
habitual orfixed phrenzy be caused though this madness was contracted by
the vice and will of the party, yet this habitual and fixed phrenzy thereby
caused puts the man into the same condition in relation to crimes, as if the
7. Reniger v. Fogossa, P.B., 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (1551).
8. Singh, History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law, 49 LAW Q. REv.
528, 530 (1933) (footnote omitted).
9. Id. (citing F. BACON, ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 29 (1630)).
10. 1 M. HALF, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32 (1778).
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same were contracted involuntarily at first.11
While Singh viewed the first of these qualifying rules as reflecting pre-
viously existing law, he thought the latter might have been in advance of
its time, though it is now universally recognized as substantially accu-
rate.12 As Blackstone expressed it, intoxication was an instance of "defi-
ciency of will," 13 and he refers to drunkenness as "artificial, voluntarily
contracted [madness] or intoxication, which, depriving men of their [rea-
son], puts them in a temporary phrenzy .... " 14 Involuntary intoxication
and insanity share the ancient characterization that neither is a "volunta-
rily contracted madness," 15 but voluntary intoxication is. No corollary
observation that includes the possibility of a category of voluntary in-
sanity appears to exist; insanity is assumed to be an "involuntarily con-
tracted madness," either because insanity is limited to mental disease
(God-given) or because insanity law is made to serve the function of
designating the mental state in question as one not voluntarily assumed.
Thus, involuntary intoxication is allowed as a complete mens rea defense
or excuse, but if the mental impairment is "voluntarily contracted mad-
ness," it is not given its full logical relevance. The term involuntary in
this context includes both coercion and lack of awareness, at least as long
as neither involves the culpability of the defendant. For reasons less
clear, the courts will recognize even a "voluntarily contracted madness"
as insanity if it has become permanent as in the case of "fixed" or "set-
tled" insanity, even though it has its origins in alcohol or other drug
abuse.16 Perkins and Boyce have expressed the opinion that:
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. See, e-g., People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 6, 69 N.W.2d 140, 142-43 (1955); Myers v. State,
174 P.2d 395, 400 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946).
13. 4 W. BLAcxsToNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 26 (1769).
14. Id. at 25.
15. Reniger v. Fogossa, P.B., 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (1551).
16. Perhaps this recognition results not so much from fault-finding in the definition of crimes
and defenses as from the futility of punishment, since the defective mental state is permanent.
There is another factor that is irrelevant to the meaning of fault. It is remarkable that, with rare
exception, neither the common law cases nor the modem statutes make any distinction between
whether the intoxicant was legal or illegal to possess or use. Thus, LSD is accorded the same signifi-
cance as alcohol, and illegal drinking by a minor is treated the same as legal drinking by an adult.
While the Model Penal Code does not make it explicit that "legal" drugs are to be equated with
"illegal" drugs, it does make clear the equation of alcohol and other drugs: "The definition [of
intoxication] ... does not confine the term to alcoholic intoxication. The use of drugs is to be treated
in the same way as the use of alcohol if the drugs similarly excite the passions or impede mental
powers in connection with allegedly criminal acts." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 8 at 12
(Tent Draft No. 9, 1959). "The great majority of states with revised codes addressing the issue have
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
226 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
[s]ince the refusal to place intoxication and insanity on the same basis (inso-
far as criminal incapacity is concerned) is due to the fact that the former is
usually a "voluntarily contracted madness," it follows that they should be
dealt with alike when the intoxication is involuntary, and such is the law
17
The law of voluntary intoxication places limitations on the defense of
lack of mens rea, and it results from a generalized conclusion that the
actor was at fault in creating a high-risk situation of temporary insanity
by gross intoxication which caused the lack of mens rea. As the courts
have long said of voluntary intoxication, as distinct from pathological
intoxication, "A man who voluntarily puts himself in condition to have
no control of his actions, must be held to intend the consequences." ' s
Thus the ancient common law rule was that "voluntary drunkenness is
no excuse for crime."19 It is thought that the very early common law
refused to take any account of voluntary intoxication in determining
criminal liability.20 Factors underlying this no-defense rule may have in-
cluded moralistic judgments regarding drunkenness,21 although this is
disputed,22 and concern that drunkenness, if allowed to reduce criminal
responsibility, either would be feigned23 or would be resorted to as a
shield by one planning the commission of a crime.24 Concern that
drunkenness could be feigned or simulated for the purpose of the com-
mission of a particular offense appears repeatedly in American case
law.2" Even this broad statement of the intoxication rule would soon be
included drugs within the intoxication provision." 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§ 2.08 comment 4 at 366 (1985). See id. at 366 n.51, which lists seven states that do not mention
drugs other than alcohol in their intoxication statutes. The contemporary courts are of the same
opinion. 1 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.10 n.2 (1986).
17. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 5, at 1001 (citing, inter alia, Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz.
99, 297 P. 1029 (1931); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115, 72 S.E. 922 (1911); People v. Robinson, 2
Park. Crim. K. 235, 304 (N.Y. 1855); Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); State
v. Gilcrist, 25 Wash. App. 327, 606 P.2d 716, 717 (1980)); Pearson's Case, 2 Lew. C.C. 144, 168
Eng. Rep. 1108 (1835).
18. People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 19 (1868).
19. Pearson's Case, 2 Lew. C.C. 144, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108 (1835).
20. Singh, supra note 8, at 530.
21. United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913, 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993) ("the law not
permitting a man to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice and misconduct .....
22. Singh, supra note 8, at 536-37.
23. M. HALE, supra note 10, at 32.
24. For a discussion of the development of common law principles regarding intoxication, see J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 529-38 (2d ed. 1960).
25. See, eg., State v. Kavanaugh, 20 Del. (4 Penne.) 131, 53 A. 335 (1902).
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modified to exclude its application to so-called specific intent crimes.26
Addressing the risk-creation justification, the drafters of the Model Pe-
nal Code stated the position that underlies their treatment of the intoxi-
cation defense and probably captures the common law position as well:
[T]here is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential conse-
quences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the
risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in our culture that we
believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks created by
the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in
becoming drunk.27
This rationale does not apply to a case of pathological intoxication
unless the risk actually assumed by or fairly assignable to the actor bears
some relation to the outcome:
Common experience teaches that consumption of too much alcohol causes
the consumer to do foolish things, but it does not teach that the consump-
tion of any alcohol, in however small a quantity, will have this effect. If,
therefore, a man becomes wildly aggressive after consuming half a glass of
beer... we cannot rely on the factor of common experience to fasten the
blame upon him.28
The difference between voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxi-
cation arises from the actor's mental state: it is the existence of fault in
bringing on the intoxication, not the nature of the resulting incapacity.
In the case of voluntary intoxication, the actor was at fault in bringing
about his own claim of lack of mens rea, and in the case of involuntary
intoxication, the actor was not at fault in doing so.
The defense of involuntary intoxication in the sense of force or fraud
by other persons has infrequent but unanimous recognition in the cases,
and it receives the same acceptance in the writings. At least since the
dictum of Baron Parke in Pearson's Case, reflecting Hale's view that "[i]f
a party be made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is not
responsible,"' 29 the idea has existed that involuntary intoxication in the
sense of inadvertent intoxication could be a complete defense. Develop-
ment of insanity law seems to have always been motivated by recognition
that the actor was not at fault for either his condition or his acts in that
condition.3" The development of the law of voluntary intoxication was
26. Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 3 at 9 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1959).
28. P. BRErr, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 202 (1963).
29. Pearson's Case, 2 Lew. C.C. 144, 145, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1108 (1835).
30. See, e.g., Brandt, The Insanity Defense and the Theory of Motivation, 7 LAW & PHIL. 123,
1991]
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based on the contrary assumption that the actor was at fault. Some
courts espouse that merely drinking is fault enough. Most, fortunately,
will couch the limitation in terms of fault, that is, some level of reckless-
ness or negligence on the part of the actor that a violent reaction or other
criminal behavior is likely to follow ingestion of alcohol.
III. EXPLORING SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Though the cases discussed here are not often currently acknowledged
as the progenitors, modem cases that confront the question of the effect
on criminal responsibility of self-induced, temporary insanity-most of
which are pathological intoxication cases3"tilt in one of two directions,
and they largely find their origins in two cases, Choice32 and Roberts,3"
originally decided in the late 1800s. Moreover, both cases illuminate the
issues generated by this phenomenon better than many of the more con-
temporary opinions and thus are more effective illustrations. The first
line of cases eventually came to represent a judge-created outlaw view of
alcohol and criminal liability, while the second champions a more tradi-
tional and personal principle of criminal responsibility, a responsibility
resting on mens rea.
A. The Fault (Culpability) Lies in Knowingly Drinking Alcohol: Strict
Liability as to the Consequent Mental Incapacity (the
Evilsizer Legacy) 34
In the 1860 Georgia case of Choice v. State,35 the defendant was con-
victed of murdering a constable who had previously tried to serve papers
on him. Testimony suggested the possibility of a pathological reaction to
alcohol, although that term was not yet in use. Medical diagnoses dif-
fered at trial.3 6 There was, however, no disagreement regarding the fact
that friends had repeatedly observed the defendant engage in violent be-
havior when he drank-all subsequent to sustaining a head injury.
136 (1988) ('The thesis I suggest about the insanity defense is that it is essentially the claim that the
state of mind of the agent at the time of his unlawful act prevents conclusive inference from his act to
a defective level of moral/legal motivation (as being its necessary condition), hence it provides a
release from culpability.").
31. L. TiFFANY & M. TIFFANY, supra note 3.
32. Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860).
33. Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870).
34. Evilsizer v. State, 487 S.W.2d 113 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
35. 31 Ga. 424 (1860).
36. See, e.g., the discussion of oinomania and mania-a-potu in Choice, 31 Ga. at 428.
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The defendant's appeal rested on a number of grounds, but most cen-
tered on the trial court's instructions regarding the insanity defense,37
and whether his conviction was against the weight of medical evidence.
There was, indeed, considerable medical testimony offered to prove that
a brain lesion combined with the use of alcohol could result in temporary
insanity.
The critical instruction objected to by defense counsel but upheld by
the court was the following:
But, though it is the general rule, that insanity is an excuse, yet, there is an
exception to this rule, and that is, when the crime is committed by a party
in a fit of intoxication, though the party may be as effectually bereft of his
reason by drunkenness as by insanity produced by any other cause. For
drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor, unless
such drunkenness was occasioned by the fraud, artifice or contrivance of
another. Nor does it make any difference, that a man by constitutional infir-
mity, or by accidental injury to the head or brain, is more liable to be mad-
dened by liquor than another man. If he has legal memory and discretion
when sober, and voluntarily deprives himself of reason, he is responsible for
his acts in that condition. 3
8
Choice is an important case, and it appears that a subsequent line of
cases has badly misunderstood Choice. The misunderstanding focuses on
the use of the phrase "voluntarily deprives himself of reason." While the
court does not dwell on the matter, it is a fair reading of the opinion to
suppose that by "voluntarily" the court meant to include "knowingly."
Viewed in this light, the court merely held that if the defendant was
aware of the underlying condition and the likely effects on him of drink-
ing alcohol, then his resulting temporary insanity was not a defense.39
What evidence supports this view of Choice? First, the court refers to
the rule that "drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misde-
meanor, unless such drunkenness was occasioned by the fraud, artifice or
contrivance of another." Although a rule of ancient origin, even it en-
compasses the notion that intoxication can be considered involuntary in-
37. Id. at 471.
38. Id. at 472 (emphasis added). See also id. at 455 (substantially the same form); Thomas v.
State, 105 Ga. App. 754, 125 S.E.2d 679 (1962) (citing and applying the same language).
39. While juries are no longer instructed in terms of presumptions based on "natural and prob-
able consequences" as they once were, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the idea of
requiring notice before fault is assigned is captured in the statement: "Massachusetts has never
recognized voluntary intoxication as a complete defense to any crime because a person is presumed
to intend the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his voluntary acts." 32 J. NOLAN, MAS-
SACHUSETTS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 645, at 465 (1976).
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toxication if it is unknowingly, as distinct from coercively, induced.
Second, the court quotes Justice Story on this point: "'There are men,'
says Mr. Justice Story, 'soldiers who have been severely wounded in the
head especially, who well know that excess makes them mad; but if such
persons willfuflly deprive themselves of reason, they ought not to be ex-
cused for one crime, by the voluntary perpetration of another.' ""
"Willfully" and "who well knows" are terms of subjective fault and not
of strict liability.
Third, ample evidence was presented in this case that the defendant's
reaction to alcohol after his head injury was consistently and extremely
abnormal and that the defendant was aware of this behavior. One assign-
ment of error on behalf of the defendant was that the court had not al-
lowed evidence that the family of the defendant had long refused to allow
him to possess deadly weapons.41 The appellate court essentially treated
the evidence exclusion as harmless in the sense of unnecessary or redun-
dant evidence based upon the other testimony of the dangerousness of
the defendant when he was drinking: "For what prudent family would
not have dreaded to see deadly weapons in the hands, or about the per-
son, of William A. Choice--one who, while in his cups, as all the proof
demonstrates, was so dangerous, both to friend and foe?"'42 It is quite
clear that the defendant knew that he reacted abnormally and violently
when drinking, and the court stressed the evidence of actual realization.
The term "voluntary intoxication" even today carries too many mean-
ings, and it ought not be surprising to find that it carried a broad range of
meaning in 1860. But even Justice Story's quoted language regarding
actors "who well know that excess makes them mad" underscores the
fact that it is the defendant's awareness of the likely outcome that ren-
ders his drunkenness to be voluntary intoxication or, more accurately in
pathological intoxication cases, renders the insanity or automatism de-
fense unavailable and calls for the application, at most, of the law of
voluntary intoxication.
In Choice, the court soundly rejected, on grounds entirely apart from
lack of knowledge,43 the defendant's additional claim that his drinking,
40. Choice, 31 Ga. at 481 (quoting United States v. Drew, 5 Mason's U.S. Rep. 28. [25 F. Cas.
28 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993)]). This quote, attributed to Justice Story, is not in the avail-
able opinion version of Drew.
41. Id. at 464.
42. Id.
43. While the defense never directly requested a charge to the jury, counsel did suggest that the
defendant was involuntarily intoxicated in the sense that we would say today that an alcoholic can-
[Vol. 69:221
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not his reaction to drinking, was involuntary; the court did not at all
discuss this issue in the sense of involuntary consumption of alcohol.
The opinion deals with neither the question of the defendant's ability to
abstain from drinking, which was rejected, nor with the "contrivance" of
third parties issue." Thus, the court's rejection of his defense comes to
rest on the fault involved in his awareness of his condition based on re-
peated prior episodes.
It would seem at this point that the type of opinion authored in Choice
could be dismissed as no more than a familiar example of an appellate
court allowing a careless trial court's instruction to pass muster on re-
view on the unarticulated ground that the error committed by omission
of a specification to find facts, not underscored or seemingly even re-
quired at all by that charge, might equitably be ignored because those
facts, relating to the actor's condition and the possible effects of drinking,
were well known to him and to everyone else who knew him, and all this
was obvious to judge and jury and eventual readers of the opinion. The
doctrine of "harmless error" and the rule that all of the instructions
taken together govern review of the adequacy of jury instructions, while
neither fits tidily here, provide the best explanation of the outcome of the
appeal.
To this day, some writers do not appear to understand that what the
court held in Choice, as virtually every subsequent authority has con-
strued it, was that the insanity defense was lost if the defendant not only
voluntarily brought it on himself, but triggered it culpably or caused the
condition to be manifested through his own fault, that is, while aware of
his susceptibility. But some writers, as well as some courts, continue to
misstate the rule by omitting any reference to fault:
Nor, it seems, is there any exemption from responsibility merely because a
man, by reason of previous injury to his head or brain, or other constitu-
tional infirmity, is more liable to be maddened by liquor than another
man.
4 5
not refrain from drinking. To this, the court was quite clear: "Upon this proposition, however, I
plant myself immovably; and from it, nothing can dislodge me but an Act of the Legislature, namely:
that neither moral nor legal responsibility can be avoided in this way." Id. at 473.
44. Professor Hall seems to have read the case as holding that the defendant was liable even
though the prior head injury led to a lack of control over drinking. Hall, Intoxication and Criminal
Responsibility, 57 HARv. L. Rv. 1045, 1057-58 (1944). I view it not as a matter of voluntariness of
the act, but as a matter of awareness of the consequences.
45. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 6.10, at 440 (M.
Barnes ed. 7th ed. 1967).
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Choice was the origin of that unfortunate statement of the law. The
statement is wrong because it fails to limit its application to situations in
which the actor is or has reason to be aware of his condition and the
likely result of drinking.
Further research on the Choice decision unearthed something interest-
ing. In State v. Kavanaugh,' a 1902 Delaware decision on a prosecution
for larceny, the court held:
It is also settled that it makes no difference in the degree of responsibility
for crime that a man, by a constitutional infirmity or by accidental injury to
the head or brain, is more liable to be maddened by liquor than another
man. If he has legal memory and discretion when sober, and voluntarily
deprives himself of reason, knowing of his infirmity, he is responsible for his
acts whilst in that condition.
47
It is not clear whether this language, virtually identical to that in
Choice, except for the italicized portion, was taken without citation from
Choice, or whether both Choice and Kavanaugh took it from some ear-
lier, common source. But the italicized portion of the Kavanaugh state-
ment does not appear in the earlier statement quoted above from Choice.
Was it added to Choice by Kavanaugh or deleted by Choice from a com-
mon source? We have been unable to find the language in any case or
writing prior to Choice, and it would appear that Choice itself was the
source and that later decisions such as Wilson,48 discussed below, and
Kavanaugh, which added a notice requirement, were direct modifications
of the language of Choice. Two subsequent Georgia cases repeated the
unmodified Choice language. In Massey v. State,4 9 the defendant testified
rather vaguely that he suffered losses of memory sometimes because of a
prior blow to the head and his chief contention was that he had taken too
much "dope" the day of the rape. In Thomas v. State,50 it is not appar-
ent from the opinion exactly how the issue was submitted to the jury.
Neither case provides clarification of Choice.
While Kavanaugh may be the correct statement, it nevertheless ap-
pears to have both adopted the language of Choice and modified it signifi-
cantly-modified it to what the Choice court should have said on those
facts in the first place, as explained earlier. Part of the difficulty is that
46. State v. Kavanaugh, 20 Del. (4 Penne.) 131, 53 A. 335 (1902).
47. Id. at 131, 53 A. at 336 (emphasis added).
48. State v. Wilson, 104 N.C. 868, 10 S.E. 315 (1889).
49. Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143, 149 S.E.2d 118 (1966).
50. Thomas v. State, 105 Ga. App. 754, 125 S.E.2d 679 (1962).
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the trial court used its instruction in Choice as a headnote that lends
itself readily to repetition without a sufficient view of the facts actually
involved in the case.51 Repetition without reference to those facts is ex-
actly what the Georgia Supreme Court did in one of the later Georgia
cases 52 and as the Georgia Court of Appeals had done earlier.53
To reiterate, Kavanaugh did not even cite Choice. Kavanaugh is diffi-
cult to categorize because it refers both to actors who are ignorant of
their infirmity and those who know of their infirmity. The Kavanaugh
opinion did, however, cite the American & English Encyclopedia of
Law,54 which had appeared two years earlier in 1900. The Encyclopedia
used language almost identical (with the knowledge requirement) to that
used by both Choice (without the knowledge requirement) and
Kavanaugh."
In State v. Wilson,56 an 1889 North Carolina case, the court approved
an instruction that said in substance:
[I]f the prisoner was so mentally or physically constituted by nature, or
because so constituted by a blow received on the head several years before,
that when he drank liquor he lost his reason, and became furious, and un-
able to control himself, and the prisoner, knowing this, voluntarily drank
liquor at the time of the homicide, and by the immediate effects of the li-
quor became frantic even to the extent that for the time being he did not
know right from wrong, and in this condition slew the deceased without
justification or excuse, he would be guilty of murder.57
The passage in the Encyclopedia was obviously taken from Choice, and
just as obviously, the Encyclopedia added the modification "knowing of
his infirmity" just as the North Carolina court had done in Wilson the
year before publication of the Encyclopedia; it was that version of the law
that the Kavanaugh court used. The editors of the Encyclopedia cited
both Choice and Wilson for the proposition that knowledge is required
("knowing of his infirmity") to defeat the defense, although Choice had
omitted it. The contradiction of citing both Choice and Wilson for the
51. Massey, 222 Ga. at 148-49, 149 S.E.2d at 123.
52. Id. at 143, 149 S.E. 2d 118.
53. Thomas v. State, 105 Ga. App. 754, 125 S.E.2d 679 (1962).
54. 17 THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (D. Garland & L. McGehee eds.
2d ed. 1900) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
55. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 54, at 405.
56. 104 N.C. 868, 10 S.E. 315 (1889).
57. Id. at 872, 10 S.E. at 316 (emphasis added).
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knowledge requirement was further compounded in the Encyclopedia by
this passage:
Rule Not Applicable Where Party Ignorant of Infirmity.-If a person be
subject to a tendency to insanity which is liable to be excited by intoxica-
tion, of which he is ignorant, having no reason from his past experience or
from information derived from others to believe that extraordinary effects
are likely to result from his intoxication, he ought not to be held responsible
for such extraordinary effects; and so far as the jury believes that his actions
resulted from these, and not from the natural effects of drunkenness or from
previously formed intentions, the same degree of competency should be re-
quired to render him capable of entertaining the intent, or responsible for it,
as when the question is one of insanity alone.58
It would seem that two cases, often taken as representing opposing
views, Choice and Roberts, discussed in the next section, are cited for the
same proposition. Indeed, most courts, such as Wilson and Kavanaugh,
took that to be the law despite the careless instruction that the court
approved in Choice.
The Texas courts, nevertheless, may have taken Choice further than it
was ever intended. Arguably, they have adopted a line of cases consis-
tent with their extraordinarily negative view of alcohol use in any con-
text5 9-cases that seem to have gained some unacknowledged adherents.
The defendant in Evilsizer6° complained of the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury that it could find insanity based on a combination of pre-
existing Korsakoff's syndrome61 and alcohol consumption. The court
seems to have held that pathological intoxication cannot be a defense
even when the actor is not aware of the condition, a position that goes
well beyond Choice.
[I]f the pre-existing condition of mind of the accused is not such as would
58. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 54, at 405 n.2 (citing Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870)).
59. See Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN. L.J.
839, 866-67 (1975), for a discussion of the Texas courts' view of alcohol consumption as a contribut-
ing factor giving rise to a situation in which the defendant claimed the necessity or choice-of-evils
defense. In one case, the defendant injured himself after drinking and was denied the defense on a
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol when, because he did not have access to a telephone,
he tried to get himself to the hospital for treatment of the wound. Butterfield v. State, 167 Tex.
Crim. 64, 317 S.W.2d 943 (1958).
60. Evilsizer v. State, 487 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
61. Korsakoff's syndrome, named after a Russian neurologist, has been defined as
"[plersonality characterized by a psychosis with polyneuritis, disorientation, muttering delirium, in-
somnia, illusions, and hallucinations .... Occurs as a sequel to chronic alcoholism but may be due
to other intracranial pathology." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 780 (C. Thomas
ed. 14th ed. 1981).
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render him legally insane in and of itself, then the recent use of intoxicants
causing stimulation or aggravation of the pre-existing condition to the point
of insanity cannot be relied upon as a defense to the commission of the
crime itself.62
A Texas statute then provided:
Neither intoxication nor temporary insanity of mind produced by the vol-
untary recent use of ardent spirits, intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or a com-
bination thereof, shall constitute any excuse for the commission of crime.
Evidence of temporary insanity produced, however, by such use of ardent
spirits, intoxicating liquor or narcotics, or a combination thereof, may be
introduced by the defendant in mitigation of the penalty attached to the
offense for which he is being tried.
63
This statute merely states the usual rule of intoxication: voluntary
(knowing) intoxication is not a defense even if it reaches the level of (tem-
porary) legal insanity. This provides no support for Evilsizer. "The
question presented by appellant is whether temporary insanity, produced
by the combined effect of a pre-existing, weakened condition of the mind
and the recent consumption of intoxicants, constitutes a defense to mur-
der with malice,"" 4 and the court held that it did not, without discussion
of any fault limitation, either in general or on the facts of this case. The
fault under Evilsizer would seem to lie in drinking.
How, in 1972, did such a view suddenly emerge? Part of the answer
may lie in Chapman v. State,65 cited as precedence in Evilsizer. In Chap-
man the defendant tried to rely on alcohol in combination with a pre-
existing condition, syphilis, which it was argued had caused brain dam-
age. The court stated, in an opinion by Judge Krueger upholding the
defendant's murder conviction:
Appellant complains because the court declined to instruct the jury that if
they believed from the evidence that appellant was affected with syphilis
and that said disease, together with the recent use of ardent spirits, pro-
duced a state of temporary insanity to acquit him. We are of the opinion
that appellant was not entitled to such an instruction. Although it may be
conceded that he had syphilis, if this alone did not produce temporary in-
sanity, but the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits in addition thereto
caused him to become temporarily insane, then the recent use of ardent
62. Evilsizer, 487 S.W. 2d at 116.
63. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN., § 36 (Vernon 1974) (repealed).
64. Evilsizer, 487 S.W. 2d at 115.
65. Chapman v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 285, 124 S.W.2d 112 (1938).
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spirits would be the direct and immediate cause of the claimed insanity, but
for which he would not have been temporarily insane.
Consequently it follows that although he may have had syphilis or may
have been in a weakened physical condition due to some other cause, yet if
the recent use of ardent spirits was the primary cause which produced the
temporary insanity, he would be in the same condition, in the eyes of the
law, as a healthy, robust man who indulged in the use of ardent spirits and
as a result became temporarily insane. It may be true that a person affected
with syphilis is more susceptible to intoxication. This, however, would not
constitute any defense, but under the law might be considered by the jury in
mitigation of the punishment to be assessed.
6 6
This opinion, upon which Evilsizer relied, makes no mention of any
facts well known to the defendant, as in Choice, regarding known, dan-
gerous susceptibility to alcohol by the defendant, which could be under-
stood to temper the language used. In the subsequent Chapman opinion
by Judge Graves, on a motion for rehearing, the court additionally ob-
served germane to the facts of that case:
The State's theory was that appellant was drunk from the use of ardent
spirits, and that his usual habit and custom when drunk was to pull his pistol
and attempt to kill some one against whom he had a real or fancied grudge
.... [T]estimony was persuasive in showing that appellant was not insane
but only drunk, and doing the same thing that he usually did when he was
drunk. 67
While it would be better procedure to have submitted these questions
to the jury more plainly, it is apparent that the court did not lay down a
general rule regarding temporary insanity. The court held that the pro-
posed instruction was properly denied in a case in which the defendant
was well aware that his violent conduct was highly predictable, based on
what appears to have been numerous previous occurrences. Chapman,
just as Choice, was clearly a case of fault on the part of the defendant in
bringing about his mental state.
The courts remain divided over the meaning of "involuntary" intoxi-
cation. In general terms, does "involuntary" in the law of involuntary
intoxication mean only unwilling consumption, or does it also include
lack of awareness as to what or how much is being consumed and the
probable level of intoxication? As late as 1982, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, without reliance on a statute, held that the defendant's
66. Id. at 290-91, 124 S.W.2d at 115-16.
67. Id. at 295, 124 S.W.2d at 118 (emphasis added).
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awareness of the effects of a combination of prescribed medicine and al-
cohol was not relevant on a charge of involuntary manslaughter because
"[a]ppellant does not contend that he was coerced into taking either
medication... or alcohol. If he was mistaken in his belief that he could
withstand the effects of the combination, that hardly makes his having
consumed them involuntary. An instruction on involuntary intoxication
was not called for in this case." 68
In Commonwealth v. Hicks,6 9 the defendant, following a bench trial,
was convicted of murder in the third degree. He had been drinking heav-
ily after taking an amphetamine-based diet pill prescribed by his physi-
cian. He chased his mother out of the residence, rampaged down the
street, finally killing someone. Essentially the court seemed to affirm the
conviction on the basis that the trial court found, as the trier of fact, that
the alcohol alone was sufficient to account for his mental state.
While it is a statement uncalled for by the facts of the case, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court deliberately went out of its way to underscore
the outlaw, strict liability view of alcohol and crime. In Commonwealth
v. Henry, the court left no room to argue that it only intended for the rule
to apply to actors who knew or should have known of the possible
reaction:
Thus, the law has developed in Pennsylvania that a defendant cannot, as a
matter of law, be insulated from criminal liability for his actions by claim-
ing a mental state resulting from alcohol which was voluntarily ingested.
Whether or not appellant was aware that he would suffer from the mental
state is irrelevant, the fact that he voluntarily ingested the alcohol being
determinative in depriving him of an insanity defense.7°
It has proven surprisingly difficult to achieve uniformity in application
of the principle enunciated by Bacon. Most courts have little trouble
telling the difference between voluntary intoxication, involuntary intoxi-
cation, and insanity or automatism, but a few, as evidenced here by the
language used in Henry, have obvious difficulty drawing the line. In the
quest for finding fault on the part of the defendant, some courts do not
distinguish between the act of drinking, awareness of the intoxicating na-
ture of what is being ingested, awareness of the incapacitating results of
68. Commonwealth v. Todaro, 301 Pa. Super. 1, 6, 446 A.2d 1305, 1308 (1982) (citation
omitted).
69. 483 Pa. 305, 396 A.2d 1183 (1979). See also Commonwealth v. Stewart, 377 Pa. Super.
530, 547 A.2d 1189 (1988); Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 347 Pa. Super. 154, 500 A.2d 453 (1985)
(the court took the same approach, citing Hicks).
70. Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 935 (1990).
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that conduct, and the question of the probability of engaging in harmful
conduct as a result of self-incapacitation. What varies is the courts' view
of fault on the part of the actor in bringing about his mental condition at
the time of the offense charged. Pennsylvania has joined those jurisdic-
tions that seem to say it is not insanity if it is brought about by the hand
of the actor, rather than by the fault of the actor. When will they say
this? One could substitute the term "inadvertent overdose of insulin" for
"alcohol" in the quoted passage and ask whether the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would hold to the same view.
B. The Fault (Culpability) Consists of Negligence or Recklessness as to
the Consequent Mental Incapacity: The Roberts Line of
Cases
In Roberts v. People71 in 1870, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
an assault conviction because the trial court did not draw the now famil-
iar distinction between intoxication as a defense to a general intent crime
as opposed to a defense to a specific intent crime. Following a quarrel
earlier in the day, the defendant inexplicably shot a man with whom he
previously had been on friendly terms. Testimony was offered to prove
that on one previous occasion, the defendant, after two ordinary doses of
whiskey administered for neuralgia, had been "deprived of the use of his
mental faculties."72 The defendant's mother and grandmother were
insane.
After determining that a new trial was required, the court went on to
consider the second major issue raised by the defense. Counsel argued
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an insanity instruction
which told the jury that the offense was excusable if caused by insanity
"aroused and called into action by the stimulus he drank."73 On what
first seems like similar grounds to those who misconceive the Choice de-
cision, the court opined that the defendant may have proved no more
than alcohol sensitivity.
The court said that insanity thus caused by intoxication would be no
defense.7' "If, therefore, the intoxication was voluntary.., any degree
of insanity thus produced would be a part of the consequences of such
71. Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870).
72. Id. at 405.06.
73. Id. at 407.
74. Id. at 422.
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voluntary intoxication"75 and would be treated as voluntary intoxication
and its defensive effects limited as explained in the first holding.
Roberts is sometimes cited for the above proposition. However, the
court took up an important point overlooked or ignored in Evilsizer and
a few other later cases.
And if, from his past experience or information, he had, while sane and
before drinking, on that day, good reason to believe that, owing to a dor-
mant tendency to insanity, intoxication would be likely to produce an ex-
traordinary degree of mental derangement beyond the effects likely to be
produced upon persons clear of any such tendency, he must be held to have
intended this extraordinary derangement as well as the intoxication and the
other results produced by it.
7 6
The court indicated that in such an event, the matter would be treated
as voluntary intoxication with the effects already noted; this could defeat
a showing of specific intent, but not general intent. The converse, and
most important, proposition was put as follows:
But if he was ignorant that he had any such tendency to insanity, and had no
reason from his past experience, or from information derived from others, to
believe that such extraordinary effects were likely to result from the intoxica-
tion; then he ought not to be held responsible for such extraordinary effects
.... [T]he same degree of competency should be required to render him
capable of entertaining, or responsible for, the intent, as when the question
is one of insanity alone .... "
The Roberts rule is that the actor must not be culpable with respect to
the possible or probable abnormal reaction from ingesting alcohol. It is
not enough to defeat the defense of pathological intoxication to "cause
the condition of one's own defense";7" to lose the exculpatory effects of
insanity, the self-inflicted insanity must be unleashed with some level of
culpability on the part of the actor.
Thus, a conventional recounting of the law that "voluntary intoxica-
tion is not a defense even if it results in insanity at the time of the act,"
can have diverse meanings, depending upon the facts to which it is ap-
plied. Voluntary drinking in the sense of knowingly consuming what is
known to be an alcoholic beverage can be confused with awareness of the
result of drinking, whether that result is normal intoxication or a patho-
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added).
78. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in
Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. Rxv. 1 (1985).
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logical reaction to alcohol. If a person has an underlying, pre-existing
condition which may trigger an atypical reaction, then this is a different
situation. Most courts realize that fault is required, but a few do not or
may not, depending upon how one reads the cases.
Commonwealth v. Brennan 79 is a modem case that deals with the com-
bination of an underlying mental disease and alcohol consumption. The
defendant was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife. He
was an alcoholic who had abstained from alcohol for eleven years, but
the victim's affair with another person left him depressed. The defendant
drank heavily and took both Valium and marijuana the day of the killing.
On the issue of criminal responsibility, the defense expert testified that
"when Brennan drank he displayed aberrant, unpredictable behavior,
emotional reactions, and violence, none of which occurred when Brennan
was not drinking." 0 The trial court ruled inadmissible the expert's opin-
ion regarding the defendant's criminal responsibility. The court on ap-
peal reversed on this point:
The expert's testimony would have warranted a finding that the defendant's
mental disease or defect, organic brain syndrome, was the cause of his lack
of criminal responsibility. Although Dr. Weisman was of the opinion that
the defendant had the capacity to understand the nature of his conduct
when he did not consume alcohol, and that his conduct when alcohol-free is
unaffected by the mental condition or defect, he was nevertheless of the
opinion that the defendant suffered from an underlying disease or defect,
apart from the alcoholism, which was the cause of his lack of criminal re-
sponsibility. The jury should have been permitted to hear this testimony
.... [L]ack of criminal responsibility is established even if voluntary con-
sumption of alcohol activated the illness, unless he knew or had reason to
know that the alcohol would activate the illness.8 1
The court also noted that the same issue had previously arisen. "In
Commonwealth v. Shelley, 2 ... the court observed that the instruction
given 'did not treat adequately the situation in which voluntary alcohol
consumption unforeseeably activates a latent mental disease or defect un-
related to alcohol use.' "83 Of course, the jury, on the defendant's own
evidence, would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty despite his
temporary mental condition because of his awareness of his reaction to
79. Commonwealth v. Brennan, 399 Mass. 358, 504 N.E.2d 612 (1987).
80. Id. at 360, 504 N.E.2d at 614.
81. Id. at 362-63, 504 N.E.2d at 615-16.
82. Commonwealth v. Shelley, 381 Mass. 340, 350, 409 N.E.2d 732, 738 (1980).
83. Brennan, 399 Mass. at 363, 504 N.E.2d at 615-16.
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alcohol. It is, nevertheless, the jury's function to do so under proper
instructions which the trial court did not give in this case.
A century after the Roberts decision was handed down, it is its dictum
that stands out as important. In People v. Kelley, 4 the court reversed a
robbery conviction due to a failure to instruct correctly on voluntary in-
toxication in relation to a specific intent crime. "The Supreme Court
ruled [in Roberts] that if the jury found that Roberts knew that intoxica-
tion would trigger a dormant tendency to insanity, then insanity would
be a defense only if the defendant was insane without regard to his intoxi-
cation.""5 The court in Kelley quotes much of the same language set out
earlier in Roberts :86
The Roberts opinion states only that intoxication may not be relied upon to
establish a defense other than intoxication when the actor knows before he
begins to drink that drinking may cause a condition which would create a
factual basis for that defense. This did not create an exception to the intoxi-
cation defense itself.8 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Absent culpability on the part of the actor in bringing about the condi-
tion of temporary insanity, why do some courts appear to reject the con-
cept of blameless, albeit self-induced, temporary insanity as a legally
useful category when its phenomenological existence is not seriously in
dispute?" One can only speculate why some courts do. To expand, or to
be perceived as expanding, defenses today, especially those involving al-
cohol and insanity, is politically dangerous. The sentiment in this coun-
try is clearly turning ever more zealously against alcohol and other
drugs. Thus, some jurisdictions may cast aside for political reasons a
defense which ought to be recognized. Those courts will convict and
imprison people who manifest not "immorality," or even recklessness,
but a pernicious medical malady, a susceptibility, sufficiently singular as
to be almost certainly unfamiliar to many judges. Because alcohol is
often implicated as a precipitating factor, the reluctance of courts to give
the defense any credence or status is even greater lest it appear that one
84. People v. Kelley, 21 Mich. App. 612, 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970).
85. Id. at 625, 176 N.W.2d at 441.
86, Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401, 422 (1870); Kelley, 21 Mich. App. at 625 n.19, 176
N.W.2d at 441 n.19.
87. Kelley, 21 Mich. App. at 625, 176 N.W.2d at 441.
88. Tiffany & Tiffany, Nosologic Objections to the Criminal Defense of Pathological Intoxication:
What Do the Doubters Doubt?, 13 INT'L J. LAW & PsYcHiATRY 49 (1990).
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favors "letting drunks get away with murder," figuratively or literally,
with predictable adverse political consequences for those judges. Ad hoc
explanations exist for other cases as the discussion has shown, but ne-
oprohibitionist attitudes may be part of the problem.
A second explanation lies in the relative ignorance, and hence mis-
trust, of courts regarding claims that alcohol consumption could inadver-
tently lead to insanity without fault. Both the Choice/Evilsizer and
Roberts line of decisions have their contemporary counterparts. 89 It
seems impossible to formulate an "objective" means to critique these ap-
proaches. The legal situation is reminiscent of the disparate contempo-
rary views of the old notion at common law,9° still discernable in the
cases,9 known as the moral wrong theory of mistake law. This theory
holds liable, despite a mistake and a concomitant failure to possess a
necessary mental state, those who were up to no good to begin with,
though doing nothing illegal or even particularly dangerous. Perhaps in
the future the law will more clearly develop in line with traditional no-
tions of fault. This will require the courts to gain a better understanding
that self-induced mental incapacity-whether through alcohol or other
external means-does not equate with fault, though fault may be in-
volved in some cases. Just as surely, in other cases, though there may be
self-inducement, there is no fault at all on the part of the actor other than
drinking, and it is difficult to understand why the actor would not be
entitled to defensive instructions reflecting that view.
89. L. TIIFFANh & M. TiFFAN'Y, supra note 3.
90. Regina v. Prince, 2 L. R.-Cr. Cases Res. 154 (1875).
91. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
[Vol. 69:221
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/11
